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![]() The CTBT may well remain in such limbo for a long time to come, unless some catalytic event comes along to re-shape national perceptions and priorities, one way or the other. Meanwhile, despite the Senate’s rejection of the treaty, the United States acts in a manner consistent with its main obligations by maintaining a moratorium on explosive nuclear testing and providing financial support (as well as technical expertise) to the CTBT Organization (CTBTO)-in particular the CTBTO’s International Monitoring System (IMS). re-review while some more » opponents seek ways to “un-sign” the treaty. Politically, the debate over the virtues and flaws of the treaty remains as strong as ever, with some CTBT advocates pushing energetically for U.S. However, the Senate’s rejection does not strip the treaty of its force as an element of customary international law or alter the will of other signatories to see it enter into force. Legally, the treaty cannot enter into force without U.S. ![]() Senate declined in 1999 to give its consent to ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the treaty remains in legal and political limbo. This report summarizes the strategy as it now exists, but we recognize that stockpile stewardship must be a continuing process-updated as necessary to respond to national security objectives. The principles of the evolving strategy were regularly discussed during the formative stages with the primary customers and stakeholders and reviewed by the JASONs. The foundation of this Science-based Stockpile Stewardship strategy was laid at a workshop attended by DOE officials, DoD customers, stakeholders from other government agencies, nuclear weapon experts, and members of the scientific community. ![]() The more » fundamental premise of the new strategy lies in the ability to respond to problems in monitoring and maintaining the existing stockpile by preserving specialized facilities, maintaining the skill and knowledge bases, and advancing our understanding of nuclear weapon physics necessary to manage the nuclear future in an era without nuclear testing. Consequently, a new strategy was needed to meet these new mission requirements. nuclear stockpile: ''To assure that our nuclear deterrent remains unquestioned under a test ban, we will explore other means of maintaining our confidence in the safety, reliability, and performance of our weapons.'' To this end, the Department of Energy's nuclear weapon program is undergoing fundamental change-from advancing military characteristics to maintaining the reliability and safety of the existing stockpile. In announcing the extension of the moratorium on nuclear testing, President Clinton reaffirmed the importance of maintaining confidence in the enduring U.S. We emphasize that these conclusions are independent of CTBT ratification-they apply provided only that the U.S. 2) Doing this would require: a) a strong weapons science and engineering program that addresses gaps in understanding b) an outstanding workforce that applies deep and broad weapons expertise to deliver solutions to stockpile problems c) a vigorous, stable surveillance program that delivers the requisite data d) production facilities that meet stewardship needs. has the technical capabilities to maintain a safe, secure, and reliable stockpile of nuclear weapons into the foreseeable future without nuclear-explosion testing. Here we discuss two main conclusions from the 2012 Academies report, which we paraphrase as follows: 1) Provided that sufficient resources and a national commitment to stockpile stewardship are in place, the U.S. could maintain a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear-weapons stockpile in the absence of nuclear-explosion testing. One important question addressed therein is whether the U.S. National Academies released a report in 2012 on technical issues related to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
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